From: "Tim Shorrock" tshorrock51@hotmail.com
Date: Sat, 3 May 2003
Subject: Copyrighted version of LABOR'S
COLD WAR By Tim Shorrock The Nation May 19, 2003
Dear colleagues:
This a copyrighted version of the story
by Tim Shorrock, "Labor's Cold War,"
which will appear in the May 19, 2003,
issue of The Nation and shortly on
the web at the URL below. Several
list-serves have transmitted the article
without permission from the author and
in truncated versions that do not
respect the integrity of the author or
his work. I would appreciate labor
list-serves to respect my rights as an
independent writer and only post this
version of the story on your website.
Thank you.
Tim Shorrock
Maryland USA
Member, National Writers Union/UAW -
AFL-CIO (Washington, D.C. Local)
This article can be found on the web at:
www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml?i=20030519&s=shorrock
Labor's Cold War
TIM SHORROCK
The Nation - May 19, 2003
http://www.thenation.com
IN THE MONTHS BEFORE PRESIDENT Bush invaded Iraq, thousands of trade
unionists joined the massive protests that filled the nation's
streets. Their ranks swelled when the AFL-CIO, for the first time in
its history, openly challenged a US decision to go to war and charged
that Bush's unilateralist policies had "squandered" the global
solidarity that America enjoyed after September 11, 2001. Once the
invasion began, AFL-CIO president John Sweeney did shift his antiwar
stance, declaring that the federation would "support fully" Bush's
war goals. But he also acknowledged the right of "people of good
conscience and good faith" to express opposition. Those events, and
Sweeney's respectful recognition of the splits in his ranks, marked a
major watershed in US labor history-and could serve as a long overdue
coda to the events of another September 11, thirty years ago, that
still inspire raging debates about labor's role in US foreign policy.
That September 11, in 1973, was the day Chilean President Salvador
Allende was overthrown in a bloody military coup that ended a brief
experiment in democratic socialism and took the lives of Allende and
thousands of Chilean workers, students and political activists.
Today, many trade unionists remain haunted by the knowledge that
their own federation, the AFL-CIO, played a key role in the US
campaign, led by the Nixon Administration and the Central
Intelligence Agency, to destabilize Chile in the years before the
coup.
From 1971 to 1973, the AFL-CIO's American Institute for Free
Labor Development (AIFLD), one of four US-government-funded labor
institutes created during the cold war, channeled millions of dollars
to right-wing unions and political parties opposed to Allende's
socialist agenda. That aid helped finance the revolt by Chile's
professional class and fanned the flames of social unrest that
provided the pretext for Gen. Augusto Pinochet's violent crackdown
and the justification for his seventeen-year dictatorship.
According to documents I've unearthed in the AFL-CIO's archives,
AIFLD's program in Chile was closely coordinated with the US Embassy
and dovetailed with one of the CIA's key aims in Chile: to split the
Chilean labor movement and create a trade union base of opposition to
Allende, who was viewed as dangerously anti-American and a pawn of
the Soviet Union. The campaign's political agenda was summarized in a
1972 cable in the archives from Robert O'Neill, AIFLD's
representative in Chile, to AFL-CIO headquarters in Washington.
Chile, O'Neill proudly told his superiors, had become the site of
"the first large-scale middle class movement against government
attempts to impose, slowly but surely, a Marxist-Leninist system."
Over the past two years, a coalition of grassroots West Coast labor
activists has been seeking to use those archives to spark a
discussion about the AFL-CIO's cold war past, when AIFLD and its
sister institutes in Asia, Africa and Eastern Europe served as
labor's spearhead in the US wars against Communism and left-wing
liberation struggles. AIFLD's actions in Chile, Brazil and other
countries, activists say, blackened the name of the AFL-CIO among the
very people to whom American unions have been reaching out in recent
years to build a movement for peace and economic justice.
Questions about the past have mingled with concerns about the
AFL-CIO's current activities abroad, such as its financial support
for the Confederation of Venezuelan Workers (CTV), which is allied
with Venezuela's business elite in a bitter campaign to topple the
leftist government of President Hugo Chávez. Initially, the AFL-CIO's
program in Venezuela was financed with a $150,000 grant from the
National Endowment for Democracy (NED), which was created by Congress
to support pro-US democratic movements abroad, and came to light last
spring, shortly after Chavez was briefly overthrown in a military
coup initially backed by the Bush Administration. To a few critics,
the incident resembled the interventionist days of old-a comparison
hotly denied by the AFL-CIO.
In response, labor councils on the West Coast have been pressing the
AFL-CIO leadership to "come clean" about the past and set the course
for the future by fully opening its archives-including materials from
the Reagan era that remain off-limits to researchers-and creating a
truth commission to analyze and publicize their contents. The
strongest resolutions, passed in 2000 by the San Francisco and South
Bay labor councils in California and in 2001 by the Washington State
AFL-CIO, asked the federation to "renounce" what it did in Chile and
elsewhere in labor's name, and allow union members and independent
researchers to make a full accounting of the past. Last July the
California Labor Federation put the weight of its 2 million members
behind the effort with a resolution asking the AFL-CIO to open a
dialogue about its government-funded foreign affairs activities, past
and present, and "affirm a policy of genuine global solidarity in
pursuit of economic and social justice."
Ultimately, the West Coast activists want to force the AFL-CIO to
draw a clear line between the cold war policies of George Meany and
Lane Kirkland and the new directions in foreign policy it has started
to map through its opposition to the Iraq war and Bush's pro-business
economic agenda. "To counter corporate globalization, we need labor
globalization," said Fred Hirsch, the vice president of Plumbers and
Fitters Local 393 in San Jose, who played an instrumental role in
getting the "clear the air" resolution before the California
federation. "But we can't embark on a path of genuine solidarity, nor
can labor unions overseas trust us, until we own up to the past and
divorce ourselves from those actions and the government funding which
made us a pawn of US foreign policy." Yet ten months after the
California resolution, Sweeney has yet to set a date for a formal
meeting with the state federation.
Sweeney was elected AFL-CIO president in 1995 with the support of a
broad coalition of union leaders who broke with Kirkland over foreign
policy-particularly AIFLD's support for US policy in Central
America-believing that the old guard's belligerent anti-Communism had
become a dangerous anachronism. After taking office, Sweeney
reorganized the four labor foreign policy institutes into a single
organization, the American Center for International Labor Solidarity
(ACILS) and forced several of the AFL-CIO's most notorious cold
warriors into retirement. The new center has refocused its mission on
global solidarity and the right to organize. In Venezuela, ACILS
insists, the US government money has helped the CTV build grassroots
democracy and protect freedom of association.
Barbara Shailor, the AFL-CIO's director of international affairs,
told The Nation that the federation is eager to begin a dialogue with
the California unions. "We won't ignore questions about the past, but
we're really going to focus on what we're doing now-organizing
opposition to the Free Trade Area of the Americas and responding to
the corporate governance meltdown," she said. But Shailor would not
comment on the activities or policies of Sweeney's predecessors. Nor
would she or her staff discuss what's in the AFL-CIO's international
archives, which are stored, along with thousands of other documents
from various AFL-CIO departments, at the George Meany Center for
Labor Studies in Silver Spring, Maryland.
Under the archives' rules, documents can only be released twenty
years after their creation, which means that the newest documents,
given staff time for processing, date back to the late 1970s.
Material about controversial AFL-CIO activities during the 1980s-such
as AIFLD's support for the Nicaraguan contras and labor cooperation
with US-backed counterinsurgencies in El Salvador and the
Philippines-remains classified under the twenty-year rule. When I
asked Shailor if the federation would consider speeding up the
release of that material or requesting classified documents from US
agencies that funded the institutes in order to provide the full
story of labor's cold war, she deferred the question to Michael
Merrill, director of the archives. Merrill said there is "no
consistent policy on what to do when someone wants to open the books
sooner." Any request to shorten the current twenty-year waiting
period, he added, would have to be approved by the senior leadership
of the AFL-CIO.
Over the past year, I've read hundreds of pages of newly released
documents in the archives. Reading through the letters, policy
papers, memos, newspaper clippings and declassified diplomatic cables
in the files, it's impossible to avoid the conclusion that the
AFL-CIO and its institutes were, in a few egregious cases, willing
handmaidens for the Pentagon and US multinational corporations as
they imposed their will on US allies and developing countries.
Nowhere was that clearer than in Chile.
Collaboration in Chile
Salvador Allende was elected Chile's president in September 1970, and
his Popular Unity government took office in November. Around that
time, a secret group within the Nixon Administration directed the CIA
to conduct a campaign of destabilization and sabotage designed, in
Nixon's unforgettable words, to "make the economy scream." The
archives contain no smoking gun directly linking the American
Institute for Free Labor Development with the CIA. But they confirm
that the AFL-CIO's program synchronized closely with the CIA's plan
to create social unrest by sowing divisions within the labor movement
and financing middle-class and professional organizations-known as
gremio-that led the opposition to Allende's populist program.
AIFLD's primary target was the 1-million-member Central Unica de
Trabajadores (CUT), Chile's largest labor federation. It was led
during the Allende years by a Communist, Luis Figueroa, whom Allende
appointed labor minister in 1972. The campaign to divide the CUT
began in earnest in the spring of 1971, after Allende had
strengthened his governing coalition in municipal elections.
In response, AIFLD, in consultation with US diplomats and the Agency for
International Development (AID), became more aggressive in seeking to
expand US influence inside the CUT. That shift was made "with the
full support of the Embassy and AID" and involved "the establishment
of a dialogue between ourselves and the non-communist Allendista
trade unionists," Jesse Friedman, AIFLD's regional director for South
America, explained to Andrew McLellan, the AFL-CIO's director for
inter-American affairs. Under the plan, Friedman wrote, AIFLD would
invite "influential leaders" from selected unions to Washington to
show them "that they have been misled in the formation of their
concept of the United States."
Robert O'Neill, AIFLD's representative in Santiago, was enthusiastic,
pointing out that US visits by Chilean unionists were the only way
that AIFLD's allies "can grow and eventually control the trade union
movement here." (Emphasis added.) He urged other US unions to get
involved because a "reinforced effort would add to the unrest." In
another cable, O'Neill laid out an ambitious plan to win over workers
in the strategic copper, oil, maritime, airline and banking
industries so they "could initially form a block within CUT to defend
their positions and eventually be the basis for a break-up of CUT."
But he hastened to add that "undeniably and unfortunately, the
majority of organized Chilean workers still back Marxist leadership,
at least in trade union elections."
By this time, the Nixon Administration, working covertly with ITT,
Kennecott Copper and other US multinationals, was deep into its
campaign to weaken the Chilean economy and punish Allende for
nationalizing industries in which US corporations held major stakes.
In November 1972 O'Neill told McLellan that a CUT leader had
approached him with a plan to unite "trade union support against
multinational companies such as Kennecott." In response, he told the
official that "since the movement would obviously be
communist-dominated, I doubted if the AFL-CIO would publicly take a
stand against Kennecott." (It never did.)
AIFLD utterly failed to make inroads into CUT or win friends among
unions striking against state-owned companies, even the copper
workers, who took AIFLD by surprise when they went on strike in 1973,
despite leadership by Communists supportive of the Allende
government. So AIFLD's strategy began to focus instead on the growing
right-wing and gremio movements. One of AIFLD's allies, the files
show, was the National Party, a notorious right-wing political group
that openly backed Pinochet's coup in 1973. In October 1972 O'Neill
proposed to use AID funds to send the director of the National
Party's labor department to Washington. "He is not a trade unionist
in the strict sense of the word since he is a professional but he
does have influence in the party structure," O'Neill noted.
In the fall of 1973, a series of strikes by truckers, doctors and
shop owners paralyzed Chile, giving Pinochet the pretext to launch
his coup. The strikes, which were partially funded by the CIA, were
no surprise to the AFL-CIO: The last pre-coup document in the Chile
files, dated May 22, 1973, shows that at least two senior AFL-CIO
officials had advance knowledge of the work stoppages. Bus and
truckers' unions "plan for unified strike action" in "early fall,
1973," McLellan wrote to Jay Lovestone, the apostate Communist who
headed the AFL-CIO's international affairs department.
Pinochet, however, saw all unions, not just left-leaning ones, as the
enemy. One of his first acts after seizing power was to outlaw the
CUT. In the months following September 11, hundreds of trade
unionists-including some who had worked with AIFLD-were rounded up,
many never to be seen again. Figueroa managed to make his way to the
Swedish Embassy, where he suffered a nervous breakdown during a
monthslong stay. In a 1975 interview in Mexico, where he died several
years later, he accused AIFLD of "13 years of massive social
espionage."
The significance of the AFL-CIO documents becomes clear in a 1975
report by the Senate Intelligence Committee on the CIA's activity in
Chile. "The scope of 'normal' activities of the CIA Station in
Santiago," the committee said, included "efforts to oppose communist
and left-wing influence in student, peasant and labor organizations";
the use of "'black' propaganda to sow discord between the Communists
and the Socialists and between the national labor confederation and
the Chilean Communist Party"; and "combating the communist-dominated
[CUT]." In his final radio broadcast to the Chilean people from the
besieged presidential palace, Allende thanked the Chilean "patriots
who a few days ago were continuing to struggle against the revolt led
by the professional unions-that is, the class unions who were trying
to hold on to the advantages granted to a few of them by the
capitalist society." His widow, in conversations with Hirsch and
others, later identified O'Neill, AIFLD's man in Santiago, as the
"number one" US intelligence operative in Chile.
The archives' Chile file for the year of the coup is remarkably thin,
as are the files on Brazil following the 1964 military coup, in which
AIFLD was heavily involved. Asked to explain, archive director
Merrill said, "It sounds like there was a pattern of people looking
through and pulling things."
One of the saddest things about the Chile files is the absence of any
statement condemning Pinochet's coup. The AFL-CIO's indifference
comes across in Meany's response to an October 3, 1973, telegram from
Patrick Gorman, then president of the Amalgamated Meat Cutters
International Union, beseeching him to protest the pending execution
of Luis Corvalan, one of Chile's leading Communists and a prominent
member of CUT. "A trade union leader in Chile could, with the present
reactionary progress of the world, be a trade union leader of the
United States tomorrow," Gorman wrote. But Meany ignored the message:
At the top of the cable appears a handwritten note by Ernest Lee, his
son-in-law and director of international affairs: "No response."
In August 1974, after it had become apparent that Pinochet was
hellbent on destroying any semblance of democracy in Chile, the
AFL-CIO executive council finally issued a statement. "Free trade
unionists did not mourn the departure of a Marxist regime in Chile
which brought that nation to political, social and economic ruin,"
the council said. "But free trade unionists cannot condone the
autocratic actions of this militaristic and oppressive ruler." For
Chilean workers, that was too little, too late.
A Whitewash of South Korea
From 1961 to 1979, South Korea was led by Park Chung Hee, a former
general who made economic development his number-one priority and
created a police state notorious for torture and long prison
sentences. Some of the worst repression was directed at unions, which
Park saw as a threat to economic growth and national security. The
only legal union, the Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU), was
under tight government control and thoroughly penetrated by the
Korean CIA (KCIA). The situation was so bad that in 1970, a young
worker in Seoul committed a fiery suicide to protest conditions in
the garment industry, an action that Korean activists point to as the
beginning of their modern labor movement.
The AFL-CIO, despite its pledge never to support
government-controlled unions, financed and supported the FKTU from
1971 until the late 1980s-with full knowledge of the government's
penetration of the FKTU. In 1971 Jack Muth, regional director of the
Asian American Free Labor Institute, wrote a report to his boss,
AAFLI executive director Morris Paladino, about a visit to Seoul.
"Undoubtedly, the US [Embassy] Mission is aware that the Korean
Government keeps a close watch on the activities of the unions," Muth
wrote. "Even during our visit, we were introduced to two Korean CIA
agents who were attending the FKTU political seminars; they were
introduced as CIA agents openly." (The toothless nature of the FKTU
is underscored by a CIA study of South Korea in 1979 that I obtained
last year under the Freedom of Information Act. "Union activities are
restricted by law," the CIA reported. "Many labor leaders still lack
credibility among the workers because they often are corrupt or have
been co-opted either by management or by the government.")
In the late 1970s US religious and human rights organizations began
calling attention to the appalling treatment of South Korean workers.
They were particularly concerned about the brutality directed at
young women laborers in the textile and garment industry, and the
lack of response by the FKTU. An AFL-CIO truly concerned about
workers' rights would have embraced those efforts by denouncing the
repression in South Korea or severing its relationship with the FKTU.
Instead, the archives show that Paladino spent much of his time
railing against the churches' involvement in Korean labor affairs. At
AAFLI's 1978 board meeting, for example, he complained bitterly about
Korean religious activists who had come to Washington to protest
"against the FKTU, alleging that women workers in South Korea are
being seriously abused by their employers and the government without
adequate representation by the FKTU unions." Their charges, he
fretted, had sparked inquiries from US textile workers and the United
Auto Workers.
At the next board meeting, in 1979, Paladino lashed out at the Urban
Industrial Mission, a religious group in Seoul that provided the only
support available to struggling young laborers. Financed by the World
Council of Churches, the mission's offices in an industrial area of
Seoul provided a safe place where employees in Korean factories could
discuss working conditions free from police spies, learn basic
organizing skills and connect to the largely underground resistance
to Park's dictatorship. Paladino, however, was incensed that the
mission's campaigns had "resulted in the diffusion of slanted and
partial information in the United States and in Europe" about South
Korea and the FKTU. In response, he told his board, AAFLI has
"attempted to keep the record straight and provide the facts to
American affiliates of the AFL-CIO whenever requested." Paladino's
goal, apparently, was to whitewash the image of one of Asia's
cruelest dictatorships.
In October 1979 Park was assassinated by the head of the Korean CIA
during a revolt in the industrial city of Pusan by students and
factory workers. Park's successor, Chun Doo Hwan, cracked down even
harder on labor, outlawing all industrial unions and sending hundreds
of church and labor activists to prison. In 1981, while Paladino was
visiting Seoul, a group of garment workers seized the AAFLI office
there to protest his refusal to meet with their illegal union. Police
were called, and dozens of workers were injured in the ensuing melee.
In a 1986 interview I conducted for The Nation, Paladino blamed the
violence on the "different ethnic standards" of Koreans.
After military rule ended in 1986, Korean industrial workers
organized the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions as an alternative
to the FKTU; it wasn't officially recognized by the AFL-CIO until
1997. "Many Koreans know the truth about AAFLI and the FKTU's
relationship to the KCIA," Kwon Young Gil, a third-party candidate in
South Korea's recent presidential election and the first president of
the KCTU, told me during a recent visit to Washington. "It's
important for American trade unionists to acknowledge those facts so
we can move forward to build a better relationship in the future."
Resistance in Okinawa
During the Indochina war, US bases on the island of Okinawa were used
by the US military to store nuclear weapons and to launch B-52
strikes on Vietnam. This infuriated the citizens of Okinawa as well
as many Japanese, sparking the political unrest that culminated in
the 1972 reversion of Okinawa to Japanese control. But in 1967 and
again in 1969, labor tensions in Okinawa boiled over, first after a
military base workers' union known as Zengunro called a general
strike to protest Okinawa's role in the war, and then when a new
labor code imposed by Washington banned strikes on US bases and
threatened strikers with severe punishment. The AFL-CIO became
directly involved in stifling Okinawan resistance.
In April 1967 F.T. Unger, the US Army's High Commissioner in Okinawa,
wrote a letter to Meany informing him that Zengunro "has veered
considerably" toward the "opposition reversion movement." He asked
Meany to send an AFL-CIO staffer to Okinawa because "the Zengunro
leadership needs a firm yet reassuring hand to protect them from the
hotheads." A year later, Meany's representative in Okinawa warned his
boss of the dangers to US interests presented by the election of a
prominent leader of the reversion movement-who was also a member of
the local teachers' union-as Okinawa's first chief executive. Japanese
leftists, he complained, were calling the election "a mandate for immediate
unconditional reversion, removal of all US military bases and ultimate
abrogation of the Japanese-US Mutual
Security Treaty in 1970"-developments anathema to the AFL-CIO.
The general strike in February 1969 infuriated Meany and his staff,
particularly because it was endorsed by Domei, the conservative
Japanese labor federation aligned with the AFL-CIO. In a memo to
Meany, his international affairs director, Ernest Lee, warned that
the strike was "primarily against the US government authority on the
island as well as US foreign policy" and "could affect our Vietnamese
effort and support a communist offensive in Vietnam." Lee became
livid when he learned that Victor Reuther, international affairs
director of the UAW and one of the few labor leaders who challenged
AFL-CIO foreign policy, was openly backing the Okinawa base workers.
Reuther's telegram of support to Okinawa, Lee told his boss, "is one
of the encouragements upon which [Japanese trade unionists] will
lean" during the strike. He added, "I believe that both State and
Defense should be aware of that cable." Turning in one of the
country's most respected labor leaders to the Pentagon surely ranks
as a low point in AFL-CIO history.
Venezuela and Beyond
Since taking control of the AFL-CIO's international programs in 1996,
Shailor and her deputy for Latin America, Stan Gacek, have worked
hard to transform relations with unions around the world. Last fall,
Sweeney and Arturo Martinez, the president of Chile's CUT, signed a
declaration urging their governments to include "enforceable
obligations" on workers' rights in any free-trade agreement and
rejecting the imposition of Chile's privatized social security system
"on the workers of the United States." (Ironically, that pact is now
threatened by US anger at Chile's refusal to vote with Bush during
the UN debate on Iraq.) And a delegation of organizing directors from
three US unions recently used ACILS funds to visit South Korea, where
they exchanged ideas with their counterparts in the KCTU. Solidarity,
in other words, has now replaced intervention as the cornerstone of
labor's foreign policy.
The AFL-CIO's overseas work, however, retains close government ties.
ACILS obtains most of its $18-million-a-year budget from AID and the
Congressionally funded NED, with some additional funds from private
foundations. AID just concluded a five-year grant to ACILS of $60
million and will provide another $9 million a year for the next five
years. ACILS currently has programs in twenty-eight countries, where,
according to Tim Beaty, deputy director of international affairs,
staffers work with overseas trade unionists "to build a better labor
movement" by linking unions within the same industry and building
coalitions with social movements. (The day of our interview, Beaty
was coordinating meetings between US unions and a delegation of
environmental activists from Taiwan trying to win compensation from
RCA for the pollution it caused there before pulling out in 1992.)
Proof of the AFL-CIO's independence from the government, Gacek told
me, "is in the application. Can we basically follow an agenda that is
not tied to any geopolitical interest other than international trade
union solidarity? Without making any comments about the past, I think
yes, that is something we are doing now."
But the AFL-CIO's experience with Venezuela's CTV illustrates how the
line between geopolitics and solidarity can get blurred. The
AFL-CIO's relationship with the CTV goes back to the 1970s, when
Venezuelan unions, through their alliance with the Democratic Action
Party, were for many years part of the center-right government. The
archives show that the AFL-CIO and the CTV worked closely in those
years to isolate Cuba and counter the influence of left-wing unions
in Latin America. The labor federations were used by the US and
Venezuelan governments as unofficial channels on oil. In a 1974
meeting with the CTV, for example, the AFL-CIO pointed out that "the
oil pricing arrangement of OPEC and of Venezuela are wrecking the
economic balance of the free world." The CTV assured Meany "that
Venezuela is a secure source of supply for the United States. We are
not the Middle East. We are similar people. We dress the same. We
have the same unions. We have the same capitalists and the same
military. When you talk with us it is not a conversation between
Kissinger and the shieks [sic] but between brother trade unionists."
Today, the CTV and the AFL-CIO remain very close, though President
Chávez has denounced the CTV and its political supporters as part of
the oligarchy that is out to weaken his attempts to redistribute the
country's oil wealth. To counter the CTV, Chávez encouraged the
organization of a rival labor federation and refused to recognize the
results of a CTV election won by former oil workers' leader Carlos
Ortega. In response, Ortega built an alliance with Fedecamaras, the
Venezuelan Chamber of Commerce, with the aim of toppling Chávez's
government.
A year ago, they came close to that goal when a general strike they
organized became the pretext for a brief military coup. When the New
York Times revealed that NED had funded the opposition, the AFL-CIO
was swamped with questions about its ties to the CTV. The AFL-CIO
immediately put out a lengthy statement condemning the coup and
explaining that the CTV used its US funds to fight Chávez's attempts
to undermine labor rights. "There is no evidence that the CTV or its
leaders went beyond the democratic expressions of discontent," the
AFL-CIO concluded. In a significant break from the past, it added
that Chávez's programs, including "agrarian reform and assistance to
Cuba, are and should be the sole and sovereign concern of the
Venezuelan people and their government." Gacek maintains today that
ACILS's support for internal democracy within the CTV boosted
progressive forces in Venezuela's labor movement. "We assisted a
process that actually brought more of the left, and including some
elements sympathetic to the admirable redistributive rhetoric of the
Chávez government, to the leadership of the CTV," he said.
But with tensions still high in Venezuela, questions remain about the
CTV and its tactics. Tellingly, strategic, non-Chavista unions in
steel, oil and the public sector didn't support the CTV during the
general strike last year. A member of a recent fact-finding
delegation to Venezuela from the International Federation of
Journalists wrote Gacek last summer that "the CTV was actively,
directly involved in the illegal plotting for the April coup." Gacek
rejected that assessment, but made it clear that the AFL-CIO was
trying to defuse the situation. He is working with Brazil's new
government and a "friends of Venezuela" labor group formed at the
World Social Forum in Porto Alegre, Brazil, to "bring down the
temperature" in Caracas by negotiating amnesty for some of the 16,000
fired oil workers Chávez has threatened to jail. (Ortega, who was on
Chávez's list, is now living in exile in Costa Rica.) Overall, said
Gacek, the AFL-CIO wants Chávez to respect the "democratic rule of
law" and insure that "violence and force are not employed to force
regime change." Using labor funds to undermine a foreign government,
he added forcefully, "goes against my fiber."
A Full Accounting
Today the labor movement is facing a multitude of challenges, from
Bush's attacks on unions to the failing economy and the fallout from
the war. Given the internal politics at the AFL-CIO, whose unity was
shaken by the recent departure of the Carpenters Union, Sweeney's
reluctance to embrace the "clear the air" movement is understandable.
Many of the unions most closely identified with the federation's cold
war policies, such as the Bricklayers and the American Federation of
Teachers, fought bitterly against Sweeney's election. Sweeney
himself, and several members of his executive council, were board
members of AIFLD and the other institutes, and would likely be
uncomfortable with a full probe of the past-as would ACILS executive
director Harry Kamberis, a former Foreign Service officer who held
senior positions in AAFLI during the 1980s.
Meanwhile, ideologues on the right may be seeking to revive their old
labor alliances in an effort to popularize American goals in the war
against terrorism around the world. Recently, American Enterprise
Institute scholar Joshua Muravchik cited Jay Lovestone and Irving
Brown-the godfathers of the AFL-CIO's overseas operations-as leading
lights in "the war of ideas that we waged in the cold war." Those
battles, he noted candidly, were fought "largely through the good
offices of the CIA," but are now being "carried out overtly by US
broadcasting agencies [and the] National Endowment for Democracy."
Although it is unlikely the AFL-CIO would join such a campaign, these
pressures raise serious questions for labor. Can the AFL-CIO continue
to work with institutions like the NED and AID and still maintain its
integrity overseas? If, even in this political climate, Colin Powell
can proclaim, as he did recently on Black Entertainment Television,
that the US role in Allende's downfall "is not a part of American
history that we're proud of," could John Sweeney finally say the same
about AIFLD?
"I think every country and every institution has a right to its own
history, particularly in the case of AIFLD, which was publicly
funded," said Robert White, who served as US ambassador to El
Salvador during one of its worst periods of repression and is now
president of the Center for International Policy. During those years,
White said, AIFLD "became a total instrument of US foreign policy. It
seems to me that the public has a right to know." Indeed, meeting
that simple demand would go a long way toward restoring the global
prestige American unions enjoyed before the cold war as the folks who
invented May Day, industrial unions and the eight-hour day.
Tim Shorrock (tshorrock51@hotmail.com) is an investigative journalist
based in Silver Spring, Maryland. Research support was provided by
the Investigative Fund of the Public Concern Foundation. He thanks
Fred Hirsch for his help in interpreting the AFL-CIO files on Chile.
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